Use policy
Clearly the rules contemplate that the buyer may sometimes be entitled to accept a short delivery, or a delivery of an excess quantity, but there may be circumstances when the buyer is not entitled to do so. Whether a buyer may ever accept goods of a different description delivered in error must be somewhat doubtful. There is also a grey area between goods of the correct description which are simply defective, and goods which could be regarded as perfect goods of a different description.' This conflation of descriptive and quantitative aspects is indicative of the imprecise thinking on this issue.
Page 5 of 44 had been a delivery of 130 bushels which the buyer retained. Thus the Court of King's Bench unanimously held that the buyer was obliged to pay for that part retained. 22 Yet whilst the buyer was not obliged to pay prior to complete delivery, he was obliged to wait until the expiration of the delivery period before bringing an action against the seller for breach of contract.
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The importance of the choice between acceptance and rejection was clear, as was the consequence of acceptance. But what was the consequence of rejection for short delivery?
The proto-texts on commercial law in the 1820s and 1830s failed to examine this point. 24 Rejection was merely treated as a mechanism for avoiding a claim by the seller for goods sold and delivered. Because it was unnecessary to consider whether the contract was terminated in such cases, the consequences of short delivery would remain unclear. This conceptual gap remained in judicial and academic analysis throughout the middle of the 19th century, causing doctrinal complexity.
Judah Benjamin's formulation
The first major text on the English law of sale, Blackburn's influential work of 1845, 25 contained no analysis of short delivery, 26 and it would be Benjamin's masterpiece of 1868 which provided the analytical structure that would remain orthodoxy for further commentary 22 (and later legislation) on short delivery. 27 However, Benjamin's description of the law on short delivery must first be contextualized in light of his views on failure of consideration.
Benjamin supported his analysis of the distinctions between total and partial failure of consideration with short-delivery cases, but did not appear to draw any explicit connection between failure of consideration and short delivery.
As Benjamin noted, the 1797 decision Giles v Edwards, 28 showed how it was 'settled law that a man who had advanced money on a contract of sale had a right to put an end to his contract for failure of consideration, and recover it an action for money had and received, if the vendor failed to comply with his entire contract.' 29 Developing this, Benjamin argued that '[w] here the failure of consideration is only partial, the buyer's right to rescind will depend on the question whether the contract is entire or not', thus, where the contract was entire (as in Giles v Edwards) 'and the buyer is not willing to accept a partial performance, he may reject the contract in toto, and recover back the price. But if he has accepted a partial performance, he cannot afterwards rescind the contract, but must seek his remedy in some there is nothing to shew that the plaintiffs ever meant to take the terra japonica at a price exceeding the limits they had given (for, the defendant represented that he had not exceeded those limits), or to accept the baskets and leaves as a substitution for an equal weight of terra japonica [this had been claimed by the defendants to be the custom in Singapore, where the goods were shipped]. It appears, therefore, to us to be a simple case of failure of consideration; and that the plaintiffs are entitled to recover the excess, as money had and received to their use.
35
This rationalisation, that it is 'a simple case of failure of consideration', is of particular historical importance as it provided a precedent for two later cases on the impact of the SGA 1893 on short delivery cases, 36 yet it also illustrates the valuable impact of Devaux. 37 Prima facie, it is hard to distinguish Devaux and Harnor: both involved actions where the goods were used in a manner inconsistent with the vendor's ownership. However, the failure of consideration in Harnor resulted not from a short delivery, but a substandard quality. This is key, because whilst quality issues raise the spectre of caveat emptor and the need to prove a warranty, quantitative issues are much easier to conceptualise without a warranty. In other words, standards of quality admit a greater variation of meaning than a particular quantitative amount, which in turn would necessitate the warranty -as an addition to the terms of the sale -to obtain the necessary quality. 38 Consequently, actions for money had and received remained viable for quantity disputes. ; 118 ER 980, where it was held that the parties had contracted to purchase goods afloat at a price calculated according to the quantity stated in the bill of lading, and not the actual quantity (the goods not being accurately quantified at that point), with the purchaser taking the benefit of an excess and the risk of the short delivery. Consequently, even though there was a short delivery in Covas, the purchaser could not recover. In response to a question by Wightman J, Mellish stated that the words in the contract 'buyer's to pay for any excess of weight' were '[p]robably' introduced as a consequence of Covas. Lord Campbell CJ distinguished Covas (in judgement of which he had sat) as it involved the sale of a specific cargo afloat a specific ship, whereas Tamvaco involved a cargo with defined maximum and minimum quantity without a specification as to a particular ship: 28 LJ QB 150, 153. Thus in Covas, the terms of the contract allowed for 'a fair mercantile speculation', by showing 'an intention to take this risk[:] … If the quantity delivered is less the purchaser will suffer; if it turn out more he will gain.' (1853) Morgan concerned a contract for the delivery of 500 piculs (a particular measurement used in South East Asia) of cotton, but only 420 piculs were delivered. Martin B commented (34 LJ Ex 165, 169-170) that had the buyer simply claimed short delivery, he would have succeeded. However, a jury had found that the buyer had accepted this short delivery, and as such was liable. There is nothing substantive in any of the reports as to the nature of the right to reject, other than statements of the obvious fact that the buyer had, in essence, waived his right to reject by accepting the short delivery. 'If the seller fail to make delivery within the time agreed between the parties, the purchaser may at his election demand the rescinding of the sale, or to be put into possession, if the delay have occurred entirely through the act of the seller.' The most recent version (available at <http://tinyurl.com/ocw3pfj> accessed 22 August 2014) reads: 'Where the seller fails to make delivery within the time agreed upon between the parties, the purchaser may, at his choice, apply for avoidance of the sale, or for his being vested with possession, if the delay results only from an act of the seller.' It is also important to bear in mind Article 1184, which reads 'Avoidance must be applied for in court, and the defendant may be granted time according to circumstances.' The use of "avoidance", or "rescission", appears to be the translation of résolution. Hoare was 'on demurrer, which the judges seem to have forgotten, and to have treated it as a special case, and drawn inferences of fact.' However, Bowen LJ (at 671) said 'the true explanation of [Hoare] is that the plea was a special plea, which set out various facts from which two different inferences might quite well be drawn, and as one or the other is drawn, the decision would appear correct or the reverse.'
In Hoare the seller was obliged to deliver to the buyer some 667 tons of iron over the period of four months in the summer of 1859, in equal portions. However, when the sellers only shipped 21 tons in June (after failing to take up the opportunity of commencing shipment in May), the buyers refused to take that delivery. to interpret as resting on the contractual breach approach:
[T]he defendants refused to accept the first shipment, because, as they say, it was not a performance but a breach of the contract. Where parties have made an agreement for themselves, the Courts ought not to make another for them … At the outset the plaintiffs failed to tender the quantity according to the contract: they tendered a much less quantity.
The defendants had a right to say that this was no performance of the interjected that the 'reasoning of the Judges in that case does not apply to the plea pleaded to the second count', and that it appeared from the report that the second count was forgotten.
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In Hoare the second count concerned the quantity of the goods; the first count concerned the time issue. This would give the impression that Blackburn J was supporting Crompton J's argument that Hoare demonstrated that time was at the root of the contract. However, to
restrict Hoare in such a fashion was misleading: there was clearly some considerable judicial consideration of the quantitative aspects in Hoare, and this appears to be recognised by In Simpson a strong Court of Queen's Bench (Blackburn, Mellor, and Lush JJ) had to deal with an instalment contract for the sale of 6000 to 8000 tons of coal, to be delivered by the defendant to the plaintiffs' wagons in equal monthly instalments over a 12 month period.
For the first instalment the plaintiffs were only able to provide wagons for some 158 tons.
Following this, the defendants attempted to annul the contract; the plaintiffs refused this annulment, so the defendants refused to deliver any more coal. It was held that the plaintiffs' acceptance of a short quantity did not entitle the defendants to terminate the contract.
Interestingly, this was a majority decision: Mellor J was unable to distinguish the case before him from that in Hoare, and as such thought that that judgment should be given effect. 107 Yet
Mellor J still felt able to agree with Blackburn J, 108 who (unsurprisingly) held Hoare was Reporter (1873), 219, 219-20, where the anonymous author also raised the question of leaving cases of nonperformance of one of a series of acts to a jury to decide whether such non-performance made future performance 'a practically different thing from that original contemplated' (with the implication that it should be a jury question). I would like to thank the anonymous reviewer for pointing out these articles. 103 Cf. text accompanying n 181. 104 Cf. S.J. Stoljar, A History of Contract at Common Law, Canberra, 1975, 177, suggesting the distinction between Hoare v Rennie and Jonassohn v Young is explicable as the former constituted a wrong delivery at the outset (and was thus a 'rejectable performance') whereas the latter, being a wrong delivery in the course of the contract, would only go to part of the consideration. This in turn is justifiable as 'a seller would have to invest sometimes heavily in the preparation of future deliveries, [and so] a rule of strict performance could cause him a loss out of all proportion to any possible damage to the other side.' However, this approach only concerns one particular type of situation, and cannot be satisfactory for buyers. It also fails to fully explore the complicated story of those particular cases. More useful is Stoljar's strong implication that this distinction can be connected to developments concerning employment contracts (and other service-based contracts, such as charterparties). This relationship can be felt in the modern law (see Thomas, 'The right to reject for short delivery and termination', 57-58), but for the sake of clarity this article will focus on sale-specific judicial reasoning. 105 113 There the defendant sold 250 tons of pig iron to the plaintiffs, half to be delivered in two weeks, the remainder two weeks later. Payment was by cash two weeks after delivery. Despite the plaintiffs' demands, the first delivery was not completed for nearly six months. The plaintiffs refused to pay, claiming a set-off in respect of money spent in purchasing alternative goods in a rising market, though they still wanted delivery of the second portion. The defendant took the refusal to pay as a breach and abandonment of the contract, and refused to deliver the remainder. It was held that the plaintiffs' refusal to pay did not, in the circumstances, warrant the defendant treating the contract as abandoned. , is the act to be relied on as rescission an act which on the part of the person doing it amounts to an abandonment, or refusal by him to perform his part of the contract?' In (1874) 22 WR 370, 371: 'the true question is, whether when one party claims to be set free by the action of another party, the action of that other party amounts to an affirmative assertion of his abandonment. Non-payment on one side, or non-delivery on the other, may amount to such an act or assertion, or, at all events, it may afford sufficient evidence of such an intention to go to a jury -that is to say, it may justify a judge in holding, or a jury in finding, that such an act amounts to an indication [of intent to abandon the contract].' Whilst it must be admitted that the official report suggests this is a jury question, the variety in the different reports raises questions about the use of 'may' in the official report, i.e. whether the question really was solely for a jury or whether a judge could direct on this point (cf. Denman J, at 22 WR 370, 371: 'what [Brett J ruled at first instance amounted to]: if you (the jury) think that the refusal to pay for the first parcel under all the circumstances amounted to a manifestation of intention to consider the whole contact at an end so far as he, the plaintiff, was concerned, then the defendants are entitled to your verdict.'). Bramwell LJ considered that the plaintiff's claim that he was entitled to demand delivery despite failing to take the initial delivery was 'contrary to law and justice alike … where no part of a contract has been performed, and one party to it refuses to perform the entirety to be performed by him, the other party has a right to refuse to perform any part to be performed by him.' 129 After providing some hypothetical examples, which, confusingly, concerned examples of the buyer refusing to accept and the seller refusing to deliver, 130 Bramwell LJ noted that for cases including short delivery, the buyer would not be obliged to perform (i.e. pay) for that part that is missing, but would be obliged to perform (i.e. pay) in correspondence to that part actually done. 131 Bramwell LJ thought that Hoare was 'in point'
and 'quite right': it was not correct to say that Simpson had overruled Hoare. 137 He thus took a pragmatic approach to the problem: because the claim was for non-delivery, 'the question is whether the failure of the plaintiff to take the first delivery prevents him from requiring a delivery at the two successive periods.' 138 Following from his reasoning in Reuter, 139 this type of contract was one which involved successive deliveries at a sum per measure, so 'inasmuch as the failure to perform one of the deliveries can be satisfied by damages, the failure in respect of one delivery does not prevent the party from having the other deliveries.' 140 Courts interpret a mercantile contract 'in the way in which reasonable business men, in the ordinary course of business, would apply it'. 141 So where merchants had agreed to separate the price such that failure of delivery could be adequately remedied by damages, the merchant's intention was clearly not 'that such non-delivery should put an end to the contract and prevent the party so failing from having a right to make subsequent deliveries.' Page 25 of 44
Honck was swiftly followed by Mersey Steel and Iron Co v Naylor. 143 In Mersey Steel the defendants agreed to purchase steel, to be delivered on board in five monthly instalments beginning in January 1881, payment within three days of receipt of shipping documents. The first delivery was only about half the required amount for that month. The February delivery amounted to about a quarter of the requirements. The sellers were subjected to a winding-up petition prior to payment becoming due. The defendants refused to pay the sellers without leave from the Court. On February 10, the sellers replied to the defendants that this failure to pay released them from obligations to carry out the remainder of the contract. A week later, the defendants claimed damages for non-delivery, and said they were prepared to accept and pay for all further deliveries, and would probably be willing to accept the January instalment if it turned up and would waive the damages claim. The liquidator (the winding-up order having been made on February 15) refused to make further deliveries, and began an action for the price for that which had been delivered.
The Court of Appeal held that the defendants' postponement of payment (made under erroneous legal advice) did not show intent to no longer be bound by the contract. Thus the plaintiffs were liable for non-delivery. Sir George Jessel MR was of the broad opinion that Coleridge's analysis, 149 thus giving the ratio set out at the outset of this paragraph. However, Bowen LJ also provided an obiter dictum indicating a shift in judicial thinking back toward the notion of breach (and the extent thereof) being the guiding idea in short delivery cases:
'Non-delivery of a single parcel would not be necessarily, of course, sufficient to intimate that the person who does not deliver intends no longer to be bound, but I am far from saying 152 He said that a fallacy may possibly lurk in the use of the word "rescission." It is perfectly true that a contract, as it is made by the joint will of two parties, can only be rescinded by the joint will of the two parties, but we are dealing here, not with the right of one party to rescind the contract, but with his right to treat a wrongful repudiation of the contract by the other party as a complete renunciation of it.
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The decision of the Court of Appeal was affirmed by the House of Lords. 154 There the Earl of Selbourne LC contented himself with Lord Coleridge CJ's formulation from Freeth, 155 and reasoned that an examination of the contract is necessary 'to see whether it amounts to a renunciation, to an absolute refusal to perform the contract, such as would amount to a rescission if he had the power to rescind, and whether the other party may accept it as a reason for not performing his part.' 156 Thus on the facts the Lord Chancellor could not 'ascribe to their conduct, under these circumstances, the character of a renunciation of the contract, a repudiation of the contract, a refusal to fulfil the contract. It is just the reverse; the purchasers were desirous of fulfilling the contract'. 159 He thought the argument that mere breach would suffice to end the contract was insufficient; the facts needed to be analysed to see if the breach went to the root of the contract. 160 For Lord Blackburn, both Hoare and Honck could be rationalised as cases where the necessity of delivery of the whole amount and no less went to the essence of the contract, and as such they stood by themselves but did not necessarily impact on the case before him. 161 Lord Bramwell followed, and appeared to agree with Lord Blackburn that Hoare and
Honck were not relevant, 162 though his most interesting comment was his retraction of his point made in Honck that part performance would prevent termination, stating 'If I did say so I recall it, because I do not think so; it depends on the nature of the contract and the circumstances of the case.' 163 What he said he had been trying to do in Honck was show that the plaintiff had been trying to make the defendant accept something 'entirely different from what had been agreed upon'.
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The confusing and complex run of cases through to Mersey Steel shows the meandering development of the doctrine on short delivery. The intial possibility that short delivery was itself a per se total failure of consideration fell away; however, short delivery could result in termination, but only if in the factual context the short delivery went to the root of the contract. 165 However, this approach in turn partially collapsed, 166 into an assessment of the parties intentions (as to whether the agreement was abandoned and the contract repudiated). It had become unclear as to whether the buyer's choice to reject the goods would necessarily terminate the contract, or whether the buyer had to make an additional choice (following rejection) to terminate. These problems would not be clarified by the SGA 1893.
The Sale of Goods Act 1893, section 30
Sir 
Operation of the Sale of Goods Act 1893, section 30 provisions
The impact of the lack of clarity over the meaning of the right to reject for short delivery may not have been immediately apparent, due to greater precision in contractual drafting. So in Pool Shipping v London Coal Co of Gibraltar, a short delivery occurred because of an unexpected rise in demand. A contractual term concerning events preventing the 'normal working of contract' was held sufficient to cover the seller's other commitments to third parties: the contract must be construed in a business sense, and would thus be suspended.
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Another relevant factor which may explain the lack of judicial clarification may have been the rise of arbitration, and the consequent removal of potentially relevant cases from the sight of the courts. 192 Other explanations for the limited judicial examination of the statutory provision may be that short deliveries were simply considered to be disputes over means and methods of ascertaining quantity to be settled by damages; 193 or they may be construed as breaches of obligations as to quality; 194 or merely as simple breaches of contract without any reference to the statutory provisions. 195 Of course, cases may be explained away because the buyer had accepted the goods and had failed to complain. 196 So it is unsurprising to find The initial starting point will be Story's important text on sales of 1847, due to its compendious nature and, in a useful correspondence to the purposes of this article, because Story hoped to lay down rules on delivery which 'will afford the clue to the labyrinth of apparently contradictory cases.' 228 Story stated that whether a partial delivery of goods to the buyer, or the refusal or neglect of the other party to deliver the remainder, would entitle him to rescind the contract utterly, would depend upon whether the contract were an entirety or not. If the contract be entire, the buyer may refuse to accept a part, and may rescind the contract, upon returning, or offering to return, the goods.
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In support of this proposition he cited Waddington v Oliver, Walker v Dixon, 230 Giles v Edwards, and Bragg v Cole. 231 The clarity of Story's interpretation of the doctrine is in marked contrast to the English commentaries, which had not gone so far as stating that a right to terminate for short delivery existed on the strength of the cases Story relied upon. 232 Story went on to the state the following:
Where, however, the contract is not entire, and the quantity or time of delivery is not of the essence of the contract, and there may be a compensation in damages for the deficiency, a partial failure of performance by the seller will not entitle the vendee to rescind the contract; but he must resort to his special action on the contract for damages. 233 To this he cited various cases concerning the effect of breach of conditions which go to the root of the contract and partial performance, 234 the correct form of action for breach of contract, 235 the extinction of a right to rescind following acts of acceptance, 236 and other matters. 237 Although there was no specific reference to case-law on short delivery, 238 the combination of these cases (in terms of their general effect), along with the previous references to short delivery cases, provide strength for the general conclusion that short delivery can entail termination of contract. The tipping points as identified by Story accord with those identified (though not often explicitly) by the English writers and judiciary:
whether the contract was entire, and whether the quantitative aspect went to the root of the contract. However, Story's emphasis on the necessity of termination should there be an entire contract where the particular quantity was essential to the contract was more powerful than the English approach. This would in turn affect later American analyses of the effect of short delivery, in particular the important decision of the US Supreme Court in 1885 in Norrington v Wright.
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Norrington concerned an Anglo-American sale of 5000 tons of iron, 'at the rate of about one thousand (1,000) tons per month, beginning February, 1880, but whole contract to be shipped before August 1, 1880'. 240 The seller shipped 'from various European ports 400
tons by one vessel in the last part of February, 885 tons by two vessels in March, 1,571 tons by five vessels in April, 850 tons by three vessels in May, 1,000 tons by two vessels in June, and 300 tons by one vessel in July, and notified to the defendants each shipment.' 241 The US Supreme Court held that the buyer had a right to rescind. Gray J, giving the judgement of the 243 Following an earlier decision of the Supreme Court, 244 the Court held that the quantity specified was a material part of the contract and thus short deliveries in cases such as this gave the buyer to 'the same right to rescind the whole contract that he would have had if it had been agreed that all the goods should be delivered at once ...
provided they distinctly and seasonably asserted the right of rescission.'
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Page 40 of 44 diversity in the law, as administered on the two sides of the Atlantic, concerning the interpretation and effect of commercial contracts of this kind, is greatly to be deprecated, [and so] it is proper to add that upon a careful examination of the cases referred to they do not appear to us to establish any rule inconsistent with our conclusion. 246 What they meant was that the weight of authority was in favour of buyer having the right to rescind (i.e. terminate) the contract for short delivery. Gray J cited Hoare v Rennie, and 
